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                                                           ABSTRACT  
 
 
The Rwanda genocide during the 1990s showed the failure of the international 
community to prevent mass atrocities and save civilians’ lives. The current 
movement toward advancing the Responsibility to Protect Resolution has grown 
out of recognition of the global community’s insufficient response to the 20th 
century mass atrocities. As a result the concept of R2P was born during that time 
in order to save people from crimes against humanity and genocide. However, 
since the 1990s until today crimes and violence against civilians continue to 
occur. For example, the situation in several Arab countries and the attacks against 
civilians such as Libya and Syria lead us to question concepts such as the 
responsibility to protect and humanitarian intervention. This thesis explores the 
concept of R2P within the UN system. This paper argues that R2P resolution 
should be done within the UN as it is an international organization which should 
have the authority to apply the concept of R2P. The problem is that within the UN 
Security Council the five permanent members maintain undue control because of 
their veto power. All countries in the UN should participate in deciding whether it 
is urgent and useful to intervene in a country to save its civilians or not. The thesis 
mainly evaluates the Uniting for Peace Resolution as a way to overcome the 5 
Permanent members veto power. 
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I. Introduction  
The Rwanda genocide showed the failure of the international community to save 
civilians.The Secretary General Kofi Annan said that “the international community failed 
Rwanda and that must leave us always with a sense of bitter regret.”1From April to July 
1994, members of the Hutu ethnic majority in the east-central African nation of Rwanda 
murdered as many as 800,000 people, mostly of the Tutsi minority.
2
 It was the 
culmination of longstanding ethnic competition and tensions between the minority Tutsi 
who had controlled power for centuries, and the majority Hutu peoples, who had come to 
power in the rebellion of 1959–62 and overthrew the Tutsi monarchy.3 In 2000, the UN 
explicitly declared its reaction to Rwanda a failure.
4
 The concept of R2P was born during 
that time in order to save people from crimes against humanity and genocide. This was 
considered a tool in order to intervene to save civilians. However, since the 1990s until 
today several crimes and violence against civilians continue to occur. The issue is that the 
international community has a responsibility to stop such violence which should be done 
within the United Nations as the universal organization with 193 members.  
Recently the Middle East is facing many changes starting with the revolution in Tunisia, 
Egypt and then in Libya. In Libya following widespread and systematic attacks against 
the civilian population by the regime in the Libya, the UN Security Council, on 26 
February 2011, unanimously adopted resolution 1970, making explicit reference to the 
responsibility to protect  deploring what it called "the gross and systematic violation of 
human rights in strife-torn Libya,”5 the Security Council demanded an end to the 
violence, recalling the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population, and 
imposed a series of international sanctions.
6
 The Council also decided to refer the 
situation to the International Criminal Court. In resolution 1973, adopted on 17 March 
                                               
1 UN chief's Rwanda genocide regret, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3573229.stm (26 
March, 2004) 
2 Id.  
3 Id. 
4 Rwanda: How the genocide happened , available at  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13431486 
5 Background Information on the Responsibility to Protect, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml 
6 Id. 
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2011,
7
 the Security Council demanded an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end 
to ongoing attacks against civilians, which it said might constitute crimes against 
humanity. The Council authorized Member States to take all necessary measures to 
protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, while excluding a foreign 
occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.  Also in Africa in response 
to the escalating, post-election violence against the population of Côte d’Ivoire in late 
2010 and early 2011, the UN Security Council, on 30 March 2011,
8
 unanimously adopted 
resolution 1975 condemning the gross human rights violations committed by supporters 
of both ex-President Laurent Gbagbo and President Ouattara. 
9
The resolution cited the 
primary responsibility of each State to protect civilians, called for the immediate transfer 
of power to President Ouattara, and reaffirmed that the UN operation in Cote d’ Ivore 
(“UNOCI”) could use all necessary means to protect life and property.10 In order to 
protect the people of Côte d’Ivoire from further atrocities, UNOCI on 4 April 2011 began 
a military operation, and President Gbagbo’s hold on power ended on 11 April when he 
was arrested by President Ouattara’s forces after days of fighting with UNOCI and the 
French military. 
11
 
 
These crises lead us to think about the concept of R2P and its application in order to 
protect the civilians. The UN’s main purpose is to maintain peace and security and R2P is 
a tool to reach this goal. This paper argues that R2P should be done within the UN system 
but not only within the Security Council because of the veto power. The problem is that 
the UN’s enforcement system and in particularly within the Security Council does not 
represent all countries of the UN. The five permanent members (France, United States, 
United Kingdom, Russia and China) through their veto can decide whether to pass a 
resolution concerning the right to intervene in a country or not. 
The General Assembly Uniting for Peace Resolution while offering a means to get 
around this veto power is still problematic because it is not binding.  
                                               
7
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, SC/10200 ( march 2011) 
 
8 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1975, S/RES/1975 ( march 2011) 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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There are debates concerning the necessity of R2P, on one hand some think that it is 
useful in order to save the live of the civilians, for example, in the article The 
Responsibility to Protect Human Rights David Miller, stated that: 
 
R2P is the responsibility of the international community and that the protection of 
human rights is one of the main aims of global governance. It is one of the main 
reasons for thinking that governance must exist on a global and not merely a 
national level. When states are unable to protect the human rights of their citizens, 
or indeed are actively involved in violating those rights on a significant scale, then 
‘the world community’ has a responsibility to step in and ensure that these rights 
are protected. 
12
 
   
Also Mehrdad Payandeh stated that: 
 
The concept of the responsibility to protect constitutes an attempt to change the 
prefix of the ongoing debate about the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian 
intervention. 2 At the core of the concept lies a two-dimensional understanding of 
responsibility: (1) the responsibility of a state to protect its citizens from 
atrocities, and (2) the responsibility of the international community to prevent and 
react to massive human rights violations.
13
 
 
On the other hand, some scholars consider it as a form of colonialism. For example, 
William Engdahl mentions in the article Humanitarian Neo-colonialism: Framing Libya 
and Reframing War that: 
The most remarkable facet of NATO's war against Libya is the fact that world 
opinion, that ever so nebulous thing, has accepted an act of overt military 
aggression against a sovereign country guilty of no violation of the UN Charter in 
an act of de facto neo-colonialism, a 'humanitarian' war in violation of basic 
precepts of the laws of nations
14
  
 
This paper does not analyze whether R2P is good or bad. However, this paper argues that 
the R2P resolution should be done within the UN as an international organization which 
should have the authority to apply the concept of R2P.  
                                               
12 David Miller, The Responsibility to Protect Human Rights 1  ( February 2006)  
http://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/normative/papers/Session6_Miller.pdf 
13 Mehrdad Payandeh, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the Responsibility 
To Protect Within the Process of International Lawmaking 470 ( 2010), http://www.yjil.org/print/volume 
14 F. William Engdahl,  Humanitarian Neo-colonialism: Framing Libya and Reframing War ( may 2011) 
available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=24617  
 
 4 
Part I of the thesis describes the evolution of the R2P concept. Part II explains the legality 
of the R2P concept within the UN Charter with a focus on the authority of the Security 
Council to issue resolution as part of its main purpose which is to maintain peace and 
security. Part III evaluates the role of the General Assembly to maintain peace and 
security. It evaluates in details the Uniting for Peace Resolution as a solution to 
alternative the Security Councils veto power control. 
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II. Evolution of the concept of R2P within the UN  
 
A. Definition of R2P 
 
In this section I will clarify the meaning of responsibility to protect. The concept of R2P 
has many sources: the rise of international humanitarian law starting with the late 
nineteenth century and accelerating in the period after World War II and the growing 
willingness of the UN Security Council, since the end of the Cold War, to authorize 
forceful and sometimes coercive actions inside refractory or weak states.
 15
  The concept 
of R2P came a result of the international community‘s feeling of a duty to protect 
civilians, in particular, against crimes such as genocide and this should be done within the 
framework of the UN. 
16
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is an international security 
and human rights doctrine which includes several important principles:
 
 
1. The primary responsibility for the protection of populations lies with the state. 
This is recognition that sovereignty includes not just rights, but responsibilities; 
2. When governments are unable or unwilling to protect their populations from   
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, the 
international community has a responsibility to take action; 
3. The international community’s responsibility is a continuum of measures 
including prevention, reaction to violence, if necessary, and rebuilding shattered 
societies. 
4. The international community should use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian 
and other peaceful means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State fails 
to protect its populations or is in fact the perpetrator of crimes, the international 
community must be prepared to take stronger measures, including the collective 
use of force through the UN Security Council.
 17
 
 
It is clear from this definition that under R2P state sovereignty is not absolute. The 
international community has a responsibility to intervene when governments and fails to 
protect its populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against 
                                               
15 Parliamentary hearing at the United Nations, 2 (20-21 November 2008) ,http://www.ipu.org/splz-
e/unga08/s4.pdf  
16 Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect 3 ( Nov. - Dec., 2002), 
http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/rdenever/PPA-730-00/Evans.pdf 
17
 Hugh Breakey, The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts: Review and 
Analysis, available at 
http://www.academia.edu/1213148/Review_and_Analysis_2012_Responsibility_to_Protect_and_the_Protection_of_   
civilians_in_Armed_Conflict 
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humanity. The concept of humanitarian intervention and then R2P was created as a result 
of the inability of the international community to intervene to save people as a result of 
massive violence. The dilemma was to have a way to balance between the right of state 
sovereignty which is mentioned in the UN charter and the main role of the UN which is 
to protect human rights. Each country which signed the UN Charter has agreed to realize 
these principles. The issue was to find a way to balance between these principles. This 
was found with the birth of the concept of humanitarian intervention and then R2P.  
 
The UN was established on 24 October 1945 by 51 countries seeking to establish a new 
basis for international relations and avoid the horrors of the two World Wars. The 
preamble of the charter stated that one of the main aims of the UN is to protect human 
rights: 
We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to 
mankind and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small
18
  
 
Article 1 (3) mentions on of the purposes of the UN charter “ promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion.” 19 In the meantime the charter in Article 2 (1) specifies 
that the organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members 
and Article 2(7) of the UN Charter: “nothing should authorize intervention in matters 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.” 20 The aim at that time was to 
avoid another world war. The pursuit of human rights was a central reason for creating 
the UN. World War II atrocities and genocide led to a ready consensus that the new 
organization must work to prevent any similar tragedies in the future. An early objective 
was creating a legal framework for considering and acting on complaints about human 
rights violations. The UN Charter obliges all member nations to promote "universal 
                                               
18 Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force 
Oct. 24, 1945. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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respect for, and observance of, human rights" and to take "joint and separate action" to 
that end. 
21
 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the General Assembly in 
1948. Its first article mentions that “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights.”22  In addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols of 1977 are considered the 
cornerstones of international humanitarian law (IHL). Unlike Human Rights Law, which 
applies both during peacetime and wartime, IHL applies only in wartime. International 
human rights law and international humanitarian law both attempts to protect the lives, 
dignity and health of individuals but from different perspectives. Both aim to protect 
human life, prohibit torture, prohibit discrimination, and provision for the protection of 
women and children. 
23
IHL deals with hostilities, combatant and prisoner of war status 
and the protection of the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems. IHRL is concerned with 
the freedom of press of expression and right to assembly. 
24
 
 
The concept of humanitarian intervention was not legitimate during the Cold War. Unlike 
conflicts during the Cold War; the level of violence directed at civilians during the post 
cold war has been unprecedented. For example, while soldiers constituted the highest 
percentage of casualties in both the First and Second World Wars, approximately 70% of 
the victims in the post-Cold War era have been civilians.
25
 In addition, while conflicts 
before and during the Cold War were mostly inter-state, nearly 80% of the wars that 
erupted in the 1990s have been intra-state.
26
 The concept of humanitarian intervention 
was not a legitimate practice during the Cold War because states placed more value on 
sovereignty. However, there was a significant shift of attitudes during the 1990s as the 
                                               
21  Id. 
22Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc    A/810 at 71 (1948). 
23 Id. 
24 International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law Similarities and differences 2, 
http://www.ehl.icrc.org/images/resources/pdf/ihl_and_ihrl.pdf 
25 Era Alhaji, The Intervention Dilemma The Dynamics of Civilian Protection in the post-Cold War 22 
,http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/TortuousRoad/Chap2.pdf 
26Id.  
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world started witnessing gross violations of human rights at a scale that was not seen 
since the Second World War In some cases, as with Rwanda, intervention was too late 
and too weak to prevent a humanitarian crisis. The 20
th
 century was marked by some of 
the worst atrocities committed by human beings such as the genocide in Rwanda, crimes 
against humanity and gross violations of human rights. These events raise the question of 
the responsibility of the international community once states are not able or not willing to 
protect their own populations.
27
 As a result the international community felt the 
importance of humanitarian intervention and at that time the concept of R2P was born 
which mentions that state sovereignty is not only a privilege but also a responsibility.  
 
28
The first definition of the Responsibility to Protect was developed under the lead of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), in the 
December 2001 The Responsibility to Protect report, by the Canadian International 
Development Research Centre. 
29
Two key principles were defined as being fundamental 
to the concept of responsibility: the first is that state sovereignty implies responsibility, 
and the primary responsibility for the protection of a people lies with the state itself; the 
second is that, where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, 
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to 
halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility 
to protect. 
30
 Taking this definition into consideration and looking at the UN Charter we 
can conclude that state sovereignty is not absolute because in cases where there is 
massive violence in a country the international community has a responsibility to 
intervene and help people. If a state were to fail to protect its citizens, it means that the 
state failed to fulfill this responsibility. Looking at the definition these principles in the 
2001 report, it is obvious that the aim behind their formulation was to provide a new 
definition of the concept of sovereignty, in an attempt to guide it in a new direction, 
focusing on the notion of sovereignty as responsibility. 
31
 
                                               
27Id. ,at 26   
28 Id. 
29 Protecting the Responsibility to Protect,( Spring 2009),  http://crisismapper.wordpress.com/papers-
articles/protecting-the-responsibility-to-protect/ 
30Id. 
31Id. 
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Later on in 2005, the discussion focused more on the supposed broader concept of 
protecting those in danger. This was clearly observed at the 2005 World Summit, “Each 
individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”32 Furthermore, member states 
also showed their commitment by accepting that responsibility, pledging to act in 
accordance. “The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help 
states to exercise this responsibility, and support the United Nations in establishing an 
early warning capability.”33 The resulting documents referred to the responsibility of the 
international community in using “appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.”34 Finally, the international community gave further commitment to 
supporting states, “Building the necessary capacity to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and to assist those 
which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.” 35This report indentifies in 
details and supports the importance of R2P and its necessity in order to protect civilians.  
 
The effort of explaining the importance of R2P did not end in 2005, as recently, in 
January 2009 Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon released a report entitled implementing the 
responsibility to protect. This report the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon described 
R2P’s three conceptual “pillars.” First, each state has the “enduring responsibility to 
protect its populations, whether nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement.” 36Second, the 
international community has the responsibility to assist states in meeting their obligations 
under the first pillar. Third, if a state “manifestly fails” to protect its people, then the 
international community has the responsibility to respond “in a timely and decisive 
                                               
32 Implementing the responsibility to protect report of the Secretary-General, G.A. 63 Sess., UN Doc. 
A/63/677 (2009) 
33 Protecting the Responsibility to Protect, (Spring 2009),  http://crisismapper.wordpress.com/papers-
articles/protecting-the-responsibility-to-protect/ 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Implementing the responsibility to protect report of the Secretary-General, G.A. 63 Sess., UN Doc. 
A/63/677 (2009) 
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manner, using Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter,” and by taking a range of 
peaceful or forceful measures. 
37
 
 
All these reports refer to the same idea which is the creation of a different understanding 
of state sovereignty. They all mention that state sovereignty is not absolute and that the 
international community has the responsibility to protect. The UN as an international 
organization is responsible for achieving its aim which is to protect human rights.  
The following section is explaining in details the evolution of the concept of R2P staring 
from the 90s until now.  
 
B. phase one: beginning of R2P concept 1990s- 2000  
 
Phase one which began in 1990 and continued until 2000 marked the beginning of the 
sense of the responsibility toward civilians suffering from mass atrocities .The end of the 
20th century marked a change in the nature of armed conflict from large inter-state wars 
to violent internal conflicts. The genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Bosnia 
demonstrated massive failures by the international community to prevent mass atrocities 
as many civilians were victims of such violence.
38
 As a result of that near the end of the 
1990s it was necessary to shift the debate about crisis prevention and response .This 
meant that the security of the community and the individual and not only the state, must 
be priorities for national and international policies. As a result of this sentiment the real 
start of the concept of R2P was during the 1990s following profound sense of fear at the 
failure of the international community to act effectively in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. 
All this created the sense and the need for a broadly accepted new norm to guide the 
international response to atrocities.
39
 In addition, this need became vital in 1999 with the 
NATO bombing to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, which began after the situation had 
                                               
37 Id. 
38 Adèle Brown , Reinventing Humanitarian Intervention: Two Cheers for the Responsibility to Protect?( 
june 2008), available at http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP08-55 
39 Id. 
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been deadlocked in the Security Council: even many who considered the intervention 
morally legitimate were troubled by its illegality under international law. 
40
  
These violent events which occurred during the 1990s led to a debate among members of  
the international community. The United Nations was deeply divided between those who 
insisted on a right of humanitarian intervention and those who viewed such a doctrine as 
an indefensible infringement of state sovereignty.
41
 The international community felt that 
something was really needed to end such crises but the way to get out or to help the 
people suffering from such violation was not clear. The concept of humanitarian 
intervention was not a legitimate practice during the Cold War because states placed 
more value on sovereignty.
42
 However, there was a significant shift of attitudes during 
the 1990s, which led the way in pressing new humanitarian claims within international 
society. The UN Secretary-General noted the extent of this change in a speech to the 
General Assembly in September 1999. Kofi Annan declared that “there was a developing 
international norm to forcibly protect civilians who were at risk from genocide and mass 
killing, but still not everyone was convinced about the legality of humanitarian 
intervention.”43 
 
 Humanitarian intervention was seen by the international community as a dangerous and 
a way to intervene in the internal affairs of countries. Many issues were raised by the 
international community such as the legal justification for military action without 
Security Council, the moral or humanitarian justification for the action, and the way in 
which the NATO allies conducted the operation. 
44
During that time, Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan warned that the UN risked discrediting itself if it failed to respond to 
catastrophes such as Rwanda and Srebrenica, and he challenged member states to agree 
on a framework for action.
45
 The Secretary General at that time only challenged member 
states to have a framework, this way of evaluating the situation marked in my point of 
                                               
40Id. 
41 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2 ( December 2001), 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf 
42 Id. 
43 Secretary General Annual  report to the General Assembly , SG/SM/7136 GA/9596 ( 1999) 
44 ICISS report supra note 41, at VII  
45 Id. 
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view the first phase of the evolution of R2P, the Secretary General stated that “if 
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should 
we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica to gross and systematic violations of human 
rights that affect every precept of our common humanity.” 46Since the beginning of the 
1990s until 2001 the concept of R2P was not really clear. The issue during that time was 
only marked by debates about the way to have a framework of actions but nothing more 
than that. The idea of humanitarian intervention was seen at that time necessary and the 
Secretary General mentioned that in several speeches but the issue needed a legal 
justification for intervention. The issue was that it was important to have a legal way to 
permit intervention and to balance between humanitarian intervention and sovereignty. 
This was a real challenge during that time and it was in response to this challenge that the 
Government of Canada, together with a group of major foundations, announced at the 
General Assembly in September 2000 the establishment of the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS): 
Our Commission was asked to wrestle with the whole range of questions – legal,        
moral, operational and political – rolled up in this debate, to consult with the 
widest possible range of opinion around the jworld, and to bring back a report that 
would help the Secretary-General and everyone else find some new common 
ground. 
47
 
 
C. Phase two: International community and R2P 2001-2004  
 
The second phase of R2P began in 2001, the international community started to feel the 
importance of the implementation of R2P as a result several reports were issued in order 
to clarify this concept.  In 2001 the principle of the responsibility to protect was first 
elaborated by a group of prominent international human rights leaders comprising the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. 48The ICISS was 
formed under the sponsorship of the Government of Canada with the goal of developing 
global political consensus about how and when the international community should 
respond to emerging crises involving the potential for large-scale loss of life and other 
                                               
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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widespread crimes against humanity.
49
  This report formulated the alternative principle of 
the responsibility to protect, focusing not on the right of outsiders to intervene but on the 
responsibility of all states to protect people at risk. 
50
  
 
The report elaborated the meaning of the concept of R2P as it shows the responsibility of 
all states to save the life of people suffering from great violence. The international 
community stated the responsibility to address massive violations of humanitarian norms 
and ensuring respect for the sovereign rights of nation states. The commission was led by 
Gareth Evans, former Foreign Minister of Australia, and Mohamed Sahnoun, Special 
Advisor to the UN Secretary-General, Focusing on the right of humanitarian intervention, 
this report examined when if ever it is appropriate for states for take coercive and in 
particular military action, against another state for the purpose of protecting populations 
at risk.
51
 In essence, the group concluded that when a group (or groups) of people is 
suffering from acts of violence resulting from internal war, insurgency, repression or state 
failure, and the state where these crimes are taking place is unable or unwilling to act to 
prevent or protect its peoples, the international community has a moral duty to intervene 
to bring to an end these atrocities.
52
 
The central theme of the report is that those sovereign states have a responsibility to 
protect their own citizens, and when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that 
responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. 
53
The report generates a 
new international consensus on these issues. The main aim at that stage was mainly to 
have the feeling of the responsibility to intervene. 
54
The issue at that time was to 
encourage the world to participate in such action whenever the UN considers its 
necessity. The ICISS outlined the “just cause threshold”, which needs to be present in 
order to justify military intervention for the purpose of human protection.
55
 An additional 
volume was compiled to the report, the responsibility to protect: research, bibliography, 
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background. It was added in order to clarify the objectives of the report. The UN 
Secretary General Kofi-Annan at the launch of the Commission's report on February 15 
2002 clarified the objective of R2P during that time. He explained that the report is trying 
to encourage countries to participate in this kind of intervention to protect people. Also 
he stated that it is very important to draw the line between the idea of sovereignty and the 
duty to save the live of people suffering from violence:  
I sought to develop the idea of two notions of sovereignty: one for States, another 
for individuals. This idea was rooted firmly in the UN Charter, which affirms the 
sovereignty of States even as it challenges us to save succeeding generations from 
the scourge of was . . . How to protect individual lives while maintaining and even 
strengthening the sovereignty of States has become clearer with the publication of 
this report. You are taking away the last excuses of the international community 
for doing nothing when doing something can save lives. 
56
  
However, the support for R2P was still limited after the release of the ICISS report. As 
ongoing humanitarian disasters, including the failure to protect the people of Darfur, 
signaled that more needed to be done by the international community as a whole to 
respond to genocide and other threats against populations.
57
 The UN believed that it was 
still necessary to issue more reports in order to implement the principle of R2P. In 
particular after the Iraqi invasion in 2003 the illegal US invasion of Iraq highlighted the 
importance of the matters and it was essential to stress on the concept of R2P.
58
 In 
September 2003, the Secretary-General called for Member States to strengthen the UN to 
better advance development, security, and the protection of human rights. In recognition 
of the urgent need to address the UN failures to respond to genocide, the Secretary-
General challenged Member States to include protection from genocide as part of this UN 
reform agenda.  
59
 
As a result of that the responsibility to protect doctrine received renewed emphasis in 
2004 when the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan created the High-Level 
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Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. The Panel was established to give more 
details concerning the new principle. It identifies major threats facing the international 
community in the broad field of peace and security and generated new ideas about 
policies and institutions aimed at preventing or confronting these challenges.
60
 It is clear 
that the panel’s purpose was to address the importance of R2P in maintaining peace and 
security which is the aim of the UN as it is mentioned in the UN Charter. After a year of 
deliberations, in December 2004 the panel issued its findings in a report entitled A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.
61
 The report provided a new assessment of the 
numerous challenges ahead for peaceful interstate relations and made recommendations 
of the necessity of these challenges to be met effectively through collective action. The 
Panel endorsed this emerging norm, stating that: 
There is a growing recognition that the issue is not the right to intervene of any 
State, but the responsibility to protect of every State when it comes to people 
suffering from avoidable catastrophe  mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by 
forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease. . 
.We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international 
responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military 
intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large scale killing, 
ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which 
sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.
62
 
The report refers to the notion of collective responsibility in order to highlight the 
importance of R2P and humanitarian intervention. The Secretary-General of the United 
Nations Kofi A. Annan mentioned in his statement the importance of the principle of R2P 
and he used the world‘s urgent need to apply R2P and the necessity to maintain peace and 
security:  
I hope people all over the world will read this report, discuss it, and urge their 
Governments to take prompt decisions on its recommendations. I believe the great 
majority of them will share my feeling that there is an urgent need for the nations 
of the world to come together and reach a new consensus - both on the future of 
collective security and on the changes needed if the United Nations is to play its 
part. For my part, I will move quickly to consider and implement, as appropriate, 
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those recommendations that are within my purview. I urge the other organs of the 
United Nations to do the same. 
63
 
 
D. Phase three: legal framework of R2P 2005-2012 
 
Phase three which began in 2005 is characterized by the formation the legal framework of 
R2P. In September 2005, R2P was once again cheered up this time with the full support 
of the international community. 
64
This year marked a new phase of the evolution of R2P 
as it marked the emergence of the legal framework. In 2005 at the 60th session of the 
U.N. General Assembly gathering, 191 heads of state and government representatives 
unanimously endorsed a resolution supporting the Responsibility to protect doctrine. 
65
This was the first time a resolution was issued concerning R2P. This resolution laid the 
foundations for a new global moral compact between every State and every population on 
earth. As adopted, atrocity crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity including ethnic 
cleansing and war crimes - were considered a universal concern and therefore were the 
responsibility of the international community.
66
  
At the World Summit in 2005 the member states included R2P in the Outcome 
Document. The next year, in April 2006, the UN Security Council formalized their 
support of the R2P by reaffirming the provisions of the paragraphs from the World 
Summit document.
67
In paragraph 138-139 of the World Summit document, Heads of 
State and government agreed to the following:  
That each individual state has the primary responsibility to protect its populations 
from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. And it 
is also a responsibility for prevention of these crimes.  Furthermore, the 
international community should encourage or assist states to exercise this 
responsibility and that the international community has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to help protect 
populations threatened by these crimes. When a state manifestly fails in its 
protection responsibilities, and peaceful means are inadequate, the international 
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community must take stronger measures, including collective use of force 
authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII.
68
   
In paragraph 138 and 139 of the General Assembly resolution the right to intervene under 
the principle of R2P is to protect people from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.
69
 The resolution provides a clear image of R2P and its legality 
according to the UN Charter. This resolution marked a difference in the evolution of R2P 
as it gives this concept a legal meaning. According to this resolution R2P should be 
executed only through the UN which has the right to issue resolutions to intervene in a 
state whenever there is a threat to international peace and security. 
70
 
As R2P is considered part of human security the World Summit outcome refers to the 
concept of human security. According to paragraph 143 the purpose of human security is 
to enable all individuals to be free from fear and want, and to enjoy all their rights and 
fully develop their human potential. 
71
 In the meantime, the Responsibility to protect 
focuses on protecting populations from specific cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleaning and crimes against humanity. Such cases result in large and complex 
humanitarian crises that are costly in terms of human lives, loss of social capital and 
financial resources, and are more difficult to resolve later. 
72
It is clear that both concepts 
are related but human security is much larger in scope, covering many more concerns. 
Human security includes the protection of people from severe and prevalent threats, and 
situations.
73
 The issues Human Security addresses include, but are not limited to, the 
following: organized crime and criminal violence, human rights and good governance, 
armed conflict and intervention, genocide and mass crimes, health and development and 
resources and environment.
74
  
 
  Following the General Assembly World Summit, the U.N. Security Council 
unanimously adopted Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict  
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on 28 April 2006. Resolution 1674 contains the first official Security Council reference to 
the Responsibility to protect as it reaffirms the provisions of paragraph 138 and 139 of 
the World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 75 
Then in Resolution 1706 31 August2006
76
, which sought to provide a peacekeeping 
mission to Darfur, the Council once again recognized the importance of R2P and re-
asserted its commitment to the principles of this doctrine.
77
 This was the first time R2P 
was applied within the framework of the UN and with the Security Council resolution.  
In September 2006, the UN Security Council had their first meeting on the situation in 
Burma and in January 2007 proposed a resolution calling for the cessation of grave 
violations of human rights. However, China and Russia both used their veto to block this 
resolution claiming that the internal affairs of a state did not belong in the Security 
Council and that the situation did not constitute threats to international peace and 
security. 78 
 
The effort of the Secretary General to emphasize the importance of the implementations 
of R2P within the UN is still in process and this is clear in several reports were issued. 
Recently, in January 2009, Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon released a report entitled 
implementing the Responsibility to Protect the first comprehensive UN document on the 
R2P. The report clarifies how to understand R2P and outlines measures and actors 
involved in rendering the norm operational.  
Based on paragraph 138-139 of the World Summit, the Secretary-General 
suggested a three-pillar approach namely 1) the protection responsibilities of the 
state, 2) international assistance and capacity building, and 3) timely and decisive 
response to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. 
79
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Moreover, another report was issued in 2010 by the Secretary-General entitled  on early 
warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect it identified gaps and proposed 
ways to improve the UN’s ability to use early warnings more effectively, including 
information from field operations and improvements to early, flexible and balanced 
responses where there is risk of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or ethnic 
cleansing.
80
 
 
Moreover, in 2011 the UN General Assembly held an informal interactive dialogue on 
the Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility 
to Protect. The report by the Secretary-General emphasized the need for effective global-
regional collaboration to help implement the responsibility to protect. 
81
The report 
identified gaps and proposed ways for the UN to strengthen its cooperation and draw on 
information and analysis from regional and sub-regional arrangements to identify signs of 
danger and undertake or support timely and effective preventative action at the sub-
regional, regional, or global level. 
82
 
 
 This chapter explained the evolution of the R2P within the UN and shows that this 
concept passed through several stages, starting in the 1990s with the Rwanda genocide 
and the first official resolution (1674) on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in 
2006 until recently with the case of Libya 
83
and Côte d’Ivoire. 84Also this chapter 
emphasized the main reports issued from 2001 until 2011 which explains the concept of 
R2P and its implementation within the UN. After describing the evolution of R2P, the 
following chapter analyzes the legality of R2P within the UN Charter.  
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 III. UN charter and R2P 
 
The concept of R2P emerged several years after the creation of the UN Charter. The UN 
Charter has not been modified since 1945 while the R2P concept was born in the 1990s. 
The concept of the responsibility to protect therefore need to be viewed within the 
context of the existing international legal system of the use of force and collective 
security as it is defined and shaped by the U.N. Charter. This chapter analyzes the way 
the R2P fits within the existing framework of protection of international peace and 
security both globally and with the help of regional organizations For this purpose the 
following section analyzes the issue of the prohibition or threat of use of force within the 
UN charter, also the authorization of the Security Council to intervene under chapter VII 
in order to maintain peace and security also the cooperation between the UN and regional 
organizations to intervene in order to maintain peace and security.  
 
A. Use of force in the UN Charter and R2P 
 
1. Legality of use of force according to the UN Charter  
 
This chapter clarifies the legality of use of force according to the UN Charter. The first 
part of the chapter identifies the reasons that resulted in the creation of the UN. In 1946 
United Nations (UN) took the place of the League of Nations, which had the same 
aspirations. The UN Charter is more detailed and precise than the League Covenant, 
since the founders of the UN aimed to establish more effective mechanism to support 
international peace and security.
85
 In this framework, in order to keep the peace and 
security, the Charter first of all offers peaceful settlement of disputes.
86
 Article 33 of the 
Charter provides that the parties to any dispute can seek a solution by negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional 
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice, and if it is 
necessary the Security Council can call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such 
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means. 
87
If a dispute cannot be resolved by these peaceful means, and the continuance of 
it constitutes a threat to the peace, the Security Council will make recommendations, or 
decide what measures scan be taken. These measures, which include use of force as well, 
are clarified in Chapter VII of the Charter.
88
 
 
The UN Charter constitutes the prevailing normative framework that governs the use of 
force .The Preamble to the Charter sets out the fundamental purpose of the organization, 
which is to maintain international peace and security.
89
  To reach this objective, the first 
chapter identifies a series of common aims and principles or guidelines for action, the 
fundamental purpose of which is the maintenance of international peace and security art. 
1.1.
90
 The general prohibition of the use of force can be considered as the starting point 
for the Charter’s system for the maintenance of international peace and security art. 2.4. 
91
According to Robert Kolb
92
, the system created in the Charter contains two parts: the 
preventive part which is dedicated to the peaceful settlement of disputes in Ch. VI and 
economic and social cooperation in Ch. X and a repressive part that regulates the 
coercive powers of the UNSC in Ch. VII. The maintenance of international peace and 
security rests fundamentally with the Security Council and the General Assembly. The 
UNSC is the organization that holds the primary responsibility for this and must carry out 
its duties in this respect in accordance with the means and principles of the United 
Nations art. 24(2.)
93
 This is mentioned in Article 24(1 )of the Charter, which justifies this 
responsibility being conferred on the UNSC in order to ensure prompt and effective 
action.
94
 The principal exceptions to the general prohibition of the use of force are the 
right to legitimate self-defense and the collective security system. The first of these 
exceptions is set out in Article 51, which set up the characteristics of the right of 
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legitimate self-defense (imminent, individual or collective), the enabling factor (armed 
attack) and the conditions under which it must be carried out (its provisional nature and 
subsidiary with respect to the collective security system). 
95
To these, three additional 
conditions deriving from general international law must be added, namely immediacy, 
necessity and proportionality.
96
 
 
The second exception to the prohibition of the use of force is the collective security 
system mentioned in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Security Council is responsible 
for determining the existence of threats to peace, breaches of peace or acts of aggression, 
which vary from vague threats through to specific acts of aggression art. 39. 
97
Once the 
situation has been categorized as one of these types, the UNSC has powers to make 
recommendations or decisions to maintain or reestablish the peace. Moreover, the UNSC 
can state provisional measures to prevent the situation from worsening, such as a 
ceasefire, the withdrawal of troops, a truce or an armistice, amongst others art. 40.
98
 In 
order to maintain or reestablish international peace and security the UNSC can take 
measures that do not involve the use of armed force, but which impact on the economic 
situation, transport and communications, or diplomatic relations art. 41.
99
 In case these 
measures are considered inadequate or fail to bring about the desired effect, the UNSC 
can take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. These actions may include demonstrations, blockade, 
and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations art. 42. 
It is important to stress that even if the measures stated within article 41 are legally 
binding on member States, the military measures of Article 42 are linked to the signing of 
special agreements through which the signatory states place at the disposal of the UNSC 
“armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security” (Art. 43). 100These agreements 
have never actually been signed, meaning that the system of collective security provided 
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for in the Charter has never been implemented. The UNSC has thus created substitute 
channels of action, provided for in the Charter or otherwise, in order to carry out coercive 
measures.
 101
 First of all, use is made of regional arrangements or agencies in order to 
apply coercive measures under the UN’s authority Art. 53. Second, the UNSC has 
authorized member States to use force to guarantee that embargoes are respected or to re-
establish international peace and security. Third, it has used the authorization of 
peacekeeping operations and of multinational forces carrying out equivalent functions to 
defend its mandate. 
102
 
 
The authorization of the use of force by the UNSC must fulfill five requisites in order to 
be legal.  First of all, the UN must pass a resolution authorizing coercive action by a 
multinational force. As Olivier Corten points out, UNSC authorizations resorting to the 
use of force can be explicit, when specific measures are detailed in the text of the 
resolution itself, or implicit when the resolution resorts to the customary method of all 
necessary means.
103
 This latter method of authorization has been the one most used by 
the UNSC. Second, any resolution that is passed must comply with the Charter, both in 
its form and content. Third, any military action must be in accordance with the UNSC 
resolution. 
104
Olivier Corten states that, “in practice, the UNSC has resorted to the 
criterion of necessity, although prescribing the use of all means necessary does not 
represent the unconditional and unlimited right to use military force .Given that actual 
cases of authorization have been highly varied, their classification is difficult.”105  In 
addition, he stated that interpretation must be done on a case by case basis and the 
transcripts of the debates reviewed in order to be certain that the use of force is 
understood to be included in the resolution.
106
 Fourth, both financing and the command 
of operations are independent of the UN.
107
 The cost of the operation is to be met by the 
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participating states, together with voluntary contributions from other states which are 
unable or unwilling to get involved on the ground. The operations are to be carried out by 
a multinational force; an aggregation of national forces each operating under its own flag. 
Fifth, the UNSC must stay in control of the authorized action. Basically, the means of 
control used by the UNSC for any authorized action include the obligatory submission of 
written reports from the states involved, the state commanding the operation or the 
Secretary-General.
108
 
 
  Kolb and Corthen’s analysis for the legality of use of force within the UN is same as the 
analysis of Evans. According to Evans, the use of force in contemporary international law 
refers to one principle and two exceptions in the Charter of the United Nations. One 
principle refers to the Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter on the principle of the prohibit ion 
on the threat or use of force and the two exceptions refer to the legal use of force 
provided in the U.N. Charter, mainly the right of self-defense, Article 51 and the forcible 
action taken or authorized by the U.N. 
109
Articles 42 and 53 the former is the unilateral 
resort to force by states, the latter is the use of force in the U.N. collective enforcement 
system. 
110
Essentially, only two types of military actions are considered legal, one is the 
action authorized by the Security Council of the United Nations; the other is the inherent 
right of self-defense of victim states. There are three ways to initiate military intervention 
under R2P: The first is an authorization from the Security Council of the UN; the second 
is the General Assembly redresses the situation under the Uniting for Peace procedure for 
an authorization for an emergent protection action; the third is regional organizations act 
under the Chapter VIII of the UN charter, subject to their seeking authorization from the 
Security Council. 
111
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The following paragraph focuses on the first way which is the authorization from the 
Security Council of the UN. The Responsibility to Protect leads the Security Council to 
interpret broadly the concept of a threat to the peace in accordance with the U.N. Charter, 
only when the Security Council determines the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace or act of aggression in accordance with Article 39, Article 42, a 
global enforcement action or Article 53 a regional enforcement action can be invoked to 
carry out or authorize implementation military actions.
112
 If genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleaning and crimes against humanity are committed within a sovereign state, which is 
not related to aggression, it does not necessarily result in a threat to the peace or a breach 
of the peace.
 
The determination of a threat to international peace and security is a 
prerequisite for the authorization of military intervention from the Security Council. 
113
  
 
Basically, the threats to the peace in Article 39 of the UN Charter refer to cross-border 
conflicts. The implementation of R2P depends on the interpretation of a threat to peace 
by the Security Council.
 114
 The perpetration of the four crimes within a state constitutes a 
threat to peace in Article 39 of the UN Charter, is not answered  in the Charter nor does it 
stipulate what situation is a threat to peace. 
115
. Statements made at the San Francisco 
conference indicate that the drafters of the U.N. Charter deliberately intended to leave the 
determination of what constitutes a threat to the peace to the discretion of the Security 
Council.
116
 This approach is further supported by the ruling of the International Court of 
Justice in the Certain Expenses case in which the court held that every organ of the 
United Nations principally determines the scope of its jurisdiction.
117
 Theoretically, it is 
possible for the Security Council to authorize military intervention through an expansion 
of interpretation of “a threat to the peace” to cover internal conflicts involving four 
crimes and the four crimes committed by a government.Mehrdad Payandeh stated that 
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“The Council acts on a case-by-case basis, and often emphasizes the unique character of 
a situation in which it decided to intervene. The endorsement of the responsibility to 
protect can therefore contribute to the entrenchment of the power of the Security Council 
to take humanitarian action.”118 Yao Huang in the article On the Military Intervention 
under the Doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect stated an example illustrating this 
issue.
119
  In 2006 after several calls upon the Government of Burma to end the systematic 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Burma and to put an end to the 
military operations targeting civilians the Security Council placed the issue of Burma as a 
threat to international peace and security on its agenda China Russia voted no claiming 
that the Security Council was not the appropriate forum for discussing Burma.
120
 In their 
explanatory statements, the Chinese and Russian representatives stated that the proposed 
resolution fell outside the mandate of the Security Council as the situation did not 
threaten international or regional peace and was therefore not appropriate for action by 
the Council. The Chinese representative argued that the situation in Burma is mainly an 
internal affair of a sovereign state.
121
  
 
Related to that example, an expansion of Article 39 the Security Council can determine 
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and 
make recommendations, or decide what measures can be taken in accordance with 
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security might raise 
controversy as it causes concern from some states about infringements of sovereign and 
intervention of internal affairs of other states. “Huang stated that many states and 
scholars, particularly developing countries and their scholars question the authorization 
of the use of force from the Security Council for military intervention on internal crisis in 
other states in post-Cold War era.”122 The representative of China stated that the U.N 
Charter imposes the Security Council a mandate to maintain international peace and 
security, the prerequisite for action is the existence of a threat to the peace, the breach of 
                                               
118 Mehrdad Payandeh, supra note 13, at 495  
119  Yao Huang, On the Military Intervention under the Doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect ,available 
at http://a10014931063.oinsite.cn/_d271634455.htm 
120Security Council fails to adopt draft resolution on Mynamar, SC/8939 ( January 2007) 
121  Id. 
122 Yao Huang, supra note 119 
 27 
the peace and act of aggression.
123
 The Security Council should consider R2P within the 
framework of the maintenance of international peace and security to avert the abuse of it. 
This case about the situation in Myanmar shows that R2P is a tool that the UN can use to 
maintain peace and security but the issue is to identify when it is a threat to international 
peace and security. Furthermore, the Responsibility to Protect Prompt the Security 
Council to interpret broadly the Concept of “a threat to the Peace” 
 
2. Legality of R2P according to the ICSS report and General Assembly World 
Summit 2005  
 
The following section analyzes the legality of R2P according to the ICSS report and the 
General Assembly World Summit 2005. In the ICSS report the commission agreed that 
the Security Council authorization must in all cases be sought prior to any military 
intervention action being carried out: 
Those calling for an intervention must formally request such authorization, or 
have the Council raise the matter on its own initiative, or have the Secretary-
General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter. The Security Council should 
deal promptly with any request for authority to intervene where there are 
allegations of large scale loss of human life or ethnic cleansing; it should in this 
context seek adequate verification of facts or conditions on the ground that might 
support a military intervention. 
124
 
 
In addition the commission added that article 42 authorizes the Security Council, in the 
event that non-military measures prove inadequate to decide upon military measures as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
125
  In addition 
they stated that even if these powers were interpreted closely during the Cold War, since 
then the Security Council has taken a very expansive view as to what constitutes 
international peace and security. As a result, for this purpose, and in practice an 
authorization by the Security Council has almost invariably been universally accepted as 
conferring international legality on an action. 
126
From the time when with the 
development made by the International Commission on Intervention and State 
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Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001, the responsibility to protect concept started to be supported 
by a diverse group of states, international and regional organizations and civil society 
groups, and has led to major projects of systemic integration and rationalization at and 
around the United Nations.
 127
 Anne Oeford stated that: 
Many commentators, including most international lawyers, have argued that the 
responsibility to protect concept remains of limited legal significance. Most 
international lawyers have concluded that the version of the responsibility to 
protect concept enshrined in the World Summit Outcome and accepted by 
Members of the General Assembly cannot be understood to impose new legal 
obligations that are binding upon states acting either unilaterally or collectively. 
128
 
 
This means that according to the ICISS report R2P does not change any legal obligations 
of the states which mean that R2P does not oppose the articles of the UN charter and that 
it fits within the Charter. The World Summit does not add new obligations it only shows 
them clearly. 
129
The responsibility of the state to protect those within its territory or 
jurisdiction from genocide and other mass atrocities was already reflected in the 
Genocide Convention,
130
 international and regional human rights treaties and the laws of 
war.
 131
 Overall, both the ICISS report and the World Summit explains clearly that R2P is 
legal and does not contradict the UN Charter. According to the UN Charter the main 
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purpose of the UN is to maintain peace and security which means that R2P can be used as 
a way to reach this goal.  
B. UN and regional organization cooperation to implement R2P  
 
The following section explains the cooperation between the UN as the universal 
organization and regional organizations in maintaining peace and security. According to 
article 24 in Chapter V of the Charter the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security is within the Security Council. The Charter provides a 
role for regional organizations and arrangements in the maintenance of peace and security 
in their respective regions.
132
 In Chapter VI Article 33(1), provides that parties to any 
dispute endangering international peace and security must, first of all seek a solution by 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to 
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
133
 In 
Chapter VIII, Article 52(1) stipulates that nothing in the Charter is to preclude the 
existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to 
the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action. 
134
It goes on to ask member states entering into such arrangements or disputes through 
such regional arrangements or constituting such agencies to make every effort to achieve 
pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such 
regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
135
 On the matter of 
enforcement action by regional arrangements, under Chapter VII Article 51, of the 
Charter, recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense. Chapter 
VIII, Article 53 (1), provides that the Security Council can, where appropriate, use such 
regional arrangements and agencies for enforcement action under its authority. 
136
However no enforcement action can be taken under regional arrangements or by 
regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. Furthermore, Article 
54 provides that the Security Council can at all times be kept fully informed of activities 
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undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for 
the maintenance of international peace and security.
137
  
 
Overall, according to the UN Charter regional organizations can cooperate with the UN 
in order to maintain peace and security.  Nevertheless, the cooperation between the UN 
and regional organizations was not enough. As the Cold War ended, it was hoped that the 
relevant parts of the UN Charter concerning the role of regional organizations and 
arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security could be invoked 
effectively. However, the cooperation was not really sufficient until the 1990s. Therefore, 
in the Agenda for Peace, issued on 31 January 1992, the Secretary-General Boutros Ghali 
recommended a greater role for regional organizations in peace-related activities:  
But in this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements or agencies can render 
great service if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the 
purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their relationship with the United 
Nations, and particularly the Security Council, is governed by Chapter VIII.
 138
 
In addition, the ICSS report pointed out the importance of such cooperation. According to 
the ICSS report regional organizations can play an effective role in maintaining peace 
and security. As many human disasters have significant direct effects on neighboring 
countries through spill-over across national borders taking such forms as refugee flows or 
use of territory as a base by rebel groups:
139
  
Such neighboring states will thus usually have a strong collective interest, only 
part of which will be motivated by humanitarian concerns, for dealing rapidly and 
effectively with the catastrophe. It has long been recognized that neighboring 
states acting within the framework of regional or sub-regional organizations are 
often better placed to act than the UN, and Article 52 of the Charter has been 
interpreted as giving them considerable flexibility in this respect. …All this 
should facilitate mobilizing the necessary will for fulfilling the responsibility to 
protect and for ensuring sustainability and follow-up. 
140
 
                                               
137Id. 
138 Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional organization / arrangements in a Peacekeeping 
environment 6 ( march 1999)  
 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNRO%20Cooperation%20between%20the%20UN%20and%20Regional%20Organ
izations.pdf  ( see  an agenda for Peace A/47/277 ) 
139ICISS report supra note 41, at  53  
140 Id. ,at 54  
 31 
It is clear that it is better to involve regional organizations to help the UN in order restore 
peace and security. As the regional organization can be more familiar with the countries 
within the region and could help in the way to solve the conflict. According to the UN 
Charter, the main body that can authorize any action is the Security Council. The only 
thing regional organizations can do is to cooperate with the UN. This also means that the 
implementation of R2P does not contradict the UN Charter. In interpreting the Charter 
R2P is a tool to intervene in order to save civilians. The charter allows the Security 
Council to enforce actions for the purpose of maintaining peace and security. A recent 
example of the cooperation between regional organization and the UN is the case of a 
crisis in Africa is the case of Côte d’ Ivoire. 141The 2010 presidential election in Côte d’ 
Ivoire resulted in a massive internal armed conflict between opposing supporters. The 
African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
responded to with efforts to resolve the crisis through mediation and diplomatic 
pressure.
142
 Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1975 on 30
th
 March, 2011, considering that the attacks taking 
place in Côte d’ Ivoire against the civilian population could amount to crimes against 
humanity, determining that the situation in Côte d’ Ivoire continues to constitute a threat 
to international peace and security.
143
 
 Finally we can conclude that the concept of R2P has so far not modified the present law 
and does not change any legal obligations of the use of force, but it has some effects on 
the collective coercive measures of the U.N. The only issue the R2P concept adds is that 
it is a tool for the Security Council to enforce its action. In addition, the UN Charter 
recognizes legitimate roles for regional organizations and regional arrangements in 
Chapter VIII.
144
 The Charter requires action by regional organizations always to be 
subject to prior authorization from the Security Council and R2P is also a tool to enforce 
the purpose of the UN. The problem is that within the Security Council not all the 
countries participate in issuing such resolution also the five permanent use veto power in 
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their interests.  The system of the Security Council is not fair as it is important that most 
members in the UN can have a voice in such decisions. 
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IV. The Uniting for Peace Resolution 
 
This section explains the relation between the general assembly and the Security Council, 
also it analyze the uniting for peace resolution and whether it could be a solution to 
overcome the veto power or no.  
The UN Charter grants the five permanent members veto power in three main areas: 
Security Council decision-making, the Charter amendments, and the appointment of the 
Secretary-General. Nowhere does the Charter oblige the P5 to provide an explanation for 
any vetoes.
145
 The motivation for the P5 veto power is to ensure that the UN Security 
Council did does suffer the same outcome as its predecessor the League of Nations
146
 
“The UN Security Council was created after the most destructive war in history to help 
the world respond to global security threats.”147 Basically, the veto power was granted to 
the P5 as way to reassure that their interests would not be ignored and in the hope that it 
would ensure their participation in the new organization.
148
Kara McDonald argues that 
“The UN Charter establishes the UNSC as the premier international watchdog, designates 
the five permanent members (P5) as guarantors of global peace, and endows each with a 
veto.”149 However, since its establishment in 1946, the Security Council has been faced 
with considerable criticism by many scholars such as Jonas von Freiesleben, Kara 
McDonald, Sahar Okhovat and Erik Voeten. Since that time there have been many calls 
for the reform of the Council. For example, in the report A More Secure World: Our 
Shared Responsibility it is stated that the Security Council needs to be reformed  
Models A and B for enlargement, both of which suggested expanding the Council 
to 24 members. Model A proposed adding six new permanent seats, but with no 
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veto power, and three new two-year term elected seats. Model B created a new 
category of eight seats, renewable every four years, and one new two-year 
nonrenewable seat.
150
 
 
A large part of the criticism is due to the structure of the Council that many believe is 
undemocratic especially because it gives considerable power and privileges to certain 
countries of the world. For example Jonas von Freiesleben stated that: 
The Security Council is without a doubt the most powerful organ of the United 
Nations. The Charter has given it primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
global peace and security and its decisions are binding for all Member States. Its 
limited geographical balance combined with five exclusive permanent seats that 
have veto powers, however, makes the Security Council less representative than 
desired by many Member States – especially emerging ‘middle’ powers – and 
they are increasingly calling for a restructuring of the Council.
151
 
 
The main example is the veto power of the Permanent Five. This was reflected in both 
the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco meetings to establish the UN where the great 
powers made it clear to the smaller powers that their choice was to accept an organization 
with great power privilege or no organization at all.
152
 The veto power was intended ‘‘to 
transform a wartime alliance into a big-power oligarchy to secure the hard won peace that 
would follow.”153 “The provisions on the structure, procedures, and competences of the 
Security Council were then accepted by the fifty nations attending the San Francisco 
Conference against considerable opposition from the medium and smaller powers.” 
154
Even though the rationale for the veto system was widely recognized as being of 
foundational importance to the UN system there have been many attempts to place limits 
on the P5 veto powers. 
155
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In reality, arguably the first effort to limit the veto came at Dumbarton Oaks when an 
Australian proposal to exclude the veto from all arrangements relating to the peaceful 
settlement of disputes was put to a vote but failed to attract enough support.
156
 As Robert 
Hill, former Australian ambassador to the United Nations, summarizes, “the Security 
Council is a club and P5 is a club within a club”.157After the UN was established there 
were several calls to reform the veto power, the most common justification being that the 
veto violated the principle of sovereign equality, that it would be used as a tool of great 
power domination, and that it would effectively exempt the P5 from being governed by 
the Council.
158
 One of the most successful endeavor in relation to limiting the veto power 
came from within the P5 when in 1950 US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, developed 
a proposal designed to neutralize the Soviet Union’s veto power in relation to the Korean 
War. 
159
In what became known as the ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure, Acheson came up 
with the idea of turning to the UN General Assembly to respond to aggression and threats 
to international peace and security when the Council was prevented from fulfilling its 
obligations because of the threat of a veto. 
160
Since the transfer of an issue from the 
Security Council to the General Assembly is considered a procedural matter it was 
therefore not subject to the P5 veto.
161
 Since then, the Uniting for Peace procedure has 
been used on more than ten occasions to facilitate UN action short of the use of force but 
its use has been rare in recent decades.
162
 
 
The 1960s also witnessed a variety of debates about how to reform the Council but these 
led only to a change in the number of the members from eleven to fifteen not the veto 
power. 
163
Similarly, the attempts to abolish the veto which took place under the Open-
Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation of and an Increase in 
the Membership of the Security Council established by the General Assembly in 1993 
                                               
156 Id. 
157  Id. (Interview with Robert Hill, June 2011.) 
158 Id. 
159 Id at 32 
160   The Responsibility Not To Veto: A Way Forward 3 ( 2010)  
http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/RN2V_White_Paper_CGS.pdf 
161 Charter of the United Nations article 27 (2), supra note 18 
162 The United Nations today, 3 ( 2008),  
https://ius.unibas.ch/uploads/publics/40490/20121220155634_50d327224317a.pdf 
163 The Responsibility Not To Veto: A Way Forward supra note 81 at 4  
 36 
came to nothing.
164
 In fact, the debate focused on the number of Security Council seats 
rather than on veto power.
165
 The same thing happened in the debates leading up to the 
2005 World Summit. Here the options on Security Council reform boiled down to two 
under which the Council would increase from 15 to 24 members with neither option 
entailing any change in the number of veto wielding powers.
166
This process seemed to 
confirm the conclusion of the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change that there was no practical way of changing the existing members 
veto powers.
167
 What these various cases illustrate is that there have long been arguments 
made which seek to limit the use of the veto. The Uniting for Peace Resolution is a way 
to overcome limitation of veto power as within the General Assembly each of the 193 
members has a voice. This is potentially a vehicle for issuing R2P resolution outside the 
Security Council.   
The UN’s main goal is to maintain peace and security and both the General Assembly 
and the Security Council can cooperate in order to reach this goal.  The General 
Assembly is the main deliberative body of the UN. As opposed to the Security Council, 
which is exclusive and grants unique veto rights to five nations, all 193 UN member 
nations have membership and equal voting rights in the General Assembly. 168The 
General Assembly has several functions according to the UN Charter which are specified 
in chapter IV.
169
 For example the GA can consider and make recommendations on the 
general principles of cooperation for maintaining international peace and security, 
including disarmament; discuss any question relating to international peace and security 
and, except where a dispute or situation is currently being discussed by the Security 
Council, make recommendations on it; discuss, with the same exception, and make 
recommendations on any questions within the scope of the Charter or affecting the 
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powers and functions of any organ of the United Nations170. According to the Uniting for 
peace resolution of November 1950  resolution 377, the Assembly may also take action if 
the Security Council fails to act, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member, in a 
case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression.
171
 The Assembly can consider the matter immediately with a view to making 
recommendations to Members for collective measures to maintain or restore international 
peace and security172. This means that the General Assembly can issue the uniting for 
peace resolution in order to intervene under the concept of R2P to save civilians from 
sever violence or genocide.  
A. The relation between the General Assembly and the Security Council  
The following section explains in details the relation between the General Assembly and 
the Security Council within the UN charter. According to article 1 of the UN Charter the 
purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security. The organization and 
its members must act in order to fulfil the main purpose of the UN.
173
 The relation 
between the Security Council and the General Assembly is not a competitive one; rather, 
each organ seeks to facilitate the work of the other in its decision-making.
174
 The General 
Assembly’s power in maintaining international peace and security was an issue between 
the smaller states represented at San Francisco and the big powers. 
175
In the Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposal, the big powers did not give any real power to the General Assembly.
176
 
At San Francisco, the smaller states insisted that not all the power should be in the hands 
of the Security Council. 
177
As a result, Chapter VI of the Charter, which contains the 
provisions relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes, represents a compromise 
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between the provisions granting generous powers to the General Assembly and the 
provisions attempting to restrict the powers and competence of the Assembly.
178
 
 
However, the Assembly’s power in maintaining international peace and security is not 
mandatory. It may only make recommendation to the members of the United Nations or 
to the Security Council or to both discuss any question relating to international peace and 
security, call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to 
endanger international peace and security, and ‘recommend measures for the peaceful 
adjustment of any situation. 
179
This means that the General Assembly has the power to 
make recommendations based upon its interpretation of a situation that may endanger 
international peace and security. 
180
The binding decision-making power is vested in the 
Security Council either through forceful action or imposing other forms of sanctions 
under Chapter VII of the Charter. However, as mentioned the Security Council may also 
request that the General Assembly provide a recommendation under Article 12(1). While 
the Security Council’s power is exercised in respect to any dispute or situation the 
functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly can not make any 
recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so 
requests. 181 It is clear that both of them work for the same purpose but there are 
differences between them. On one side, the Security Council has five permanent 
members with veto power and also the resolutions passed by the SC are binding. On the 
other side, the General Assembly is more democratic in the sense that each member has a 
vote but the resolutions of the GA according to the UN charter are not binding. The 
Uniting for Peace resolution has been used several times to overcome the veto power. 
The following section explains in details the Uniting for Peace Resolution.  
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B. Uniting for Peace 
 
The following part covers the historical background about the uniting for peace with a 
detailed explanation on the case of the Suez Canal and the Uniting for peace resolution 
  
1. Historical background  
a. The role of UN in the decolonized world 
The idea that the UN has a responsibility to maintain order and protect life in the 
decolonized world began to take shape with the creation of the United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF) in response to the Suez crisis of 1956 and the UN operation in 
the Congo in 1960. 
182
Since that time, the UN and other international actors have 
developed and systematized an expansive body of practices aimed at maintaining order 
and protecting life in the decolonized world. When the UN was requested to intervene in 
the Suez crisis in 1956 and the Congo crisis in July 1960, both the requesting 
governments and then UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold believed that the UN 
could operate as a neutral force to protect life, maintain order and preserve the 
independence of newly decolonized states. 
183
The Suez and Congo crises were situations 
in which the old colonial powers were suddenly confronted with the material effects of 
decolonization. The creation of UNEF and UN operation in the Congo in response 
changed the landscape of international politics in two ways.
184
 On the one hand, those 
operations signaled the end of a particular version of informal empire and worked to 
delegitimize the resort to force by powerful states with neo imperial ambitions. 
185
On the 
other hand, the innovations in international executive rule that were consolidated and 
developed during that period such as fact-finding, peacekeeping, civilian administration 
and centralized forms of technical assistance have since expanded to become core 
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techniques for governing the decolonized world.
186
 The following part describes the birth 
of the uniting for peace resolution.  
 
b. The beginning of the Uniting for Peace Resolution 
 
The Uniting for Peace resolution was a result of the early Cold War division between 
East and West. The failure of the Security Council to perform the functions assigned to it 
by the Charter because of the veto used by the Soviet Union brought about a change in 
the relative power of the Council and the Assembly. 187 The Assembly had to take over the 
role of the Security Council when it was difficult to perform its primary responsibility to 
maintain international peace and security.
188
 The Uniting for Peace resolution therefore 
realized broader support among the international community in general, which wanted to 
see the United Nations as active as it could be in restoring international peace and 
security. 189 As a result it was a great achievement for the General Assembly in 
performing its duty to maintain the most fundamental objective of the Charter peace. In 
1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. The UN Security Council acted rapidly to 
deploy UN troops under US General Douglas MacArthur, to repel the North Korean 
forces. The Soviet Union was boycotting the UN at the time and thus was not able to 
exercise its veto as a permanent member of the Security Council. However, when the 
boycott ended the Soviet Union used its veto in the votes. Furthermore, it constantly 
questioned the validity of the resolutions of the Security Council adopted in its absence. 
This provoked the Council to call for an emergency session of the General Assembly, 
which adopted a Uniting for Peace resolution in early November 1950. 
190
The resolution 
was actually a US proposal to make the UN more efficient in dealing with future threats 
to the peace.
 191
 However, the General Assembly adopted a series of resolutions on the 
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Korean issue after the Uniting for Peace procedure had been established in resolution 377 
(A). 
192
Resolution 498 (V), for example, adopted on 1 February 1951, which asked the 
members of the UN to increase their assistance to UN Force, perhaps indicates an action 
under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution. 193 
 
2. The Suez Canal and the Uniting for Peace resolution 
 
The Uniting for Peace resolution was also used in 1956, at that time the UN faced a major 
crisis threatening the stability of the Middle East. The US and UK decided to withdraw 
their financial aid for the Aswan Dam. 
194
 Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez Canal 
and stated that all revenues from the canal would be used to finance the project. The 
French and British reacted strongly condemning that action. 
195
Israel, in coordination 
with France and the UK, launched an attack on Egypt. The UN called for the first time an 
emergency session this was as a result of the failure of Security Council to take any 
actions because of the vetoes of France and UK. The issue was referred to the General 
Assembly under the uniting for peace resolution calling for a ceasefire and the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces.196  
 
The UN action in the Suez led to the consolidation of three significant power-shifts in 
international relations. It was a moment at which former European imperial powers were 
forced to recognize that the conservation of the old colonial system was no longer 
possible.
197
 It was obvious after Suez that powerful states would no longer readily be able 
to secure access to resources or strategic advantage through temporary occupation, police 
action or land appropriation.
198
 In addition, newly independent states would not be free to 
deny foreign access to and control over resources. “As an alternative, the Suez operation 
sustained a second geopolitical shift the strengthening of an Americanized global 
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economy, premised upon openness to investment, free trade, nondiscrimination and the 
international management of resources in the decolonized world. Thirdly, the Suez 
operation empowered the UN executive function.”  199 
3- Debate regarding the General Assembly resolution 377 
There was a debate concerning the Uniting for Peace Resolution (resolution 377). The 
Uniting for Peace procedure gave rise to a strong debate between the West and the 
Socialist countries. The debate was mainly based on political interest as each side was 
thinking whether it would benefit or no. In the end according to the UN Charter it was 
proven that the resolution was legal: 
Resolution 377 (A): 
if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, 
fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly consider the 
matter immediately with a view to make the appropriate recommendations to 
Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression to use armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.
200
 
a- Possibility of the UNGA substituting the UNSC and issuing the Uniting for peace 
resolution  
As I stated earlier that the Uniting for Peace procedure gave rise to a debate between the 
Western and the Socialist countries, the argument raised by the Soviet Union was that 
Articles 10 to 14 of the Charter indicates that the Security Council and the General 
Assembly cannot be substituted for one another; they only complement each other. 
201
By 
raising a broader interpretation of Article 12, the pro-West countries argued that when the 
Council was paralysed by the veto, it was not functioning in the sense of that provision. 
202
Article 12 (1) “while the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or 
situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly does 
not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security 
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Council so requests.” 203 Article 12(2) “the Secretary-General, with the consent of the 
Security Council, notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to 
the maintenance of international peace and security . . . or the Members of the United 
Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council 
ceases to deal with such matters.”204 
In reaction, the Soviet Union replied that operation of the veto was an integral function of 
the Security Council. Furthermore, the proposed resolution would only require a 
procedural vote to transfer the matter from the Security Council to the General Assembly, 
while the special session called for under Article 20 needed a substantive vote. What is 
more, the Soviet Union argued that Article 11(2) 2 does not allow the General Assembly 
to take coercive action, as this action falls solely within the authority of the Security 
Council: 
205
 
Article 11 the General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member 
of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a 
Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, 
except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any 
such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to 
both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the 
Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion. 206 
In Certain Expenses, 207 the International Court of Justice explained the role of the 
General Assembly with regard to the maintenance of the peace. While the Court did not 
mention whether the General Assembly could recommend coercive action, it can be 
inferred from the Court’s view that the General Assembly is not barred from 
recommending enforcement action.
 208
 The basis of the Uniting for Peace resolution was 
to maintain the purposes and objectives of the United Nations, more accurately, the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, when the Security Council 
fails to perform its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, the 
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General Assembly in which all member states participate need clearly to take up the 
responsibility. 
 The Uniting for Peace resolution represents an interpretation of Article 11(2) and 12 that 
has been accepted and acted upon by the members of the United Nations, including the 
Soviet Union and all other members originally opposed to the resolution.209 The Charter 
itself declares that the General Assembly can make a recommendation on any important 
question, such as maintenance of international peace and security, with a two-thirds 
majority of the members present.
210
 If both the General Assembly and the Security 
Council are seized of the same question, it could easily happen that contradictory 
solutions may be taken by each of these organs.
211
 For this reason, it is quite natural that 
in this conflict of interest the Assembly should give way to that organ which is primarily 
responsible for the matter concerned. Therefore the Charter provides that the General 
Assembly cannot make any recommendation with regard to a dispute or situation while 
the Security Council is exercising its functions in respect of such dispute or situation 
(Article 12).
212
 
 After this debate all about the Uniting for Peace Resolution countries were reassured in 
particular after the ICJ advisory opinion that the General Assembly can issue the uniting 
for peace resolution. In addition, this right is within its duty that the UN charter imposed. 
213
However, the legality of the Uniting for Peace resolution may still be questioned on a 
different issue. The Charter under Article 2(4) explicitly prohibits any kind of threat of 
force or use of force against the political independence and the territorial integrity of any 
state. 
214
The only exceptions are action in self-defense under Article 51 and military 
action by the Security Council under Article 42. 
215
The question arises whether an 
authorization by the General Assembly to use force may lead to a violation of Article 
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2(4). 216 The exceptions to the ban on the use of force are those undertaken in legitimate 
self-defense and those authorized by the United Nations. In the case of the Uniting for 
Peace Resolution, the General Assembly was only playing the role that should have been 
played by the Security Council. The inability of the Security Council to act caused this 
responsibility to be transferred to the General Assembly. 
217
By its authorization in the 
resolution the General Assembly did not in fact pose any threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The General Assembly tends to 
resist aggression that has threatened the world peace. 
218
For example, in the Korean 
conflict in 1950 the authorization of use of force was intended to help defend South 
Korea from the North Korean invasion; no offensive action was authorized. Therefore, it 
was only a self-defense measure.
219
 Article 51 of the Charter justifies collective self-
defense. This means that the General Assembly plays the role of the Security Council 
which was not possible as a result of the veto power of the P5. 
220
 However, the Uniting 
for Peace resolution is not binding. 
b. Legality of the Uniting for Peace Resolution within the UN Charter 
This section explores the legality of the uniting Peace resolution within the UN charter. 
In order to know whether it is possible to use the 377 resolution it is important to specify 
when exactly it can be used and under which chapter of the UN.
221
 Under Part A 
paragraph 1 of the Resolution, the General Assembly can consider any case where there 
appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, whenever the 
Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of its permanent members, fails to 
exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.
222
 In that case, the General Assembly can consider the matter immediately with 
a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures. 
Among these measures even the use of armed force might be recommended, if there is a 
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breach of peace or act of aggression.
223
 The Resolution refers only to the highest degree 
of danger to peace. The Charter distinguishes several degrees of danger. The lower 
degree, motivating the application of Chapter VI, is represented by disputes or situations 
the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security Articles 33 and 34,
224
 there the danger for peace is farther. 
225
However, action 
under Chapter VII takes place only in cases of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression Article 39. 
226
Chapter VII coordinates rather different cases of danger 
to peace: on the one hand, cases where there is a great danger to peace, but the peace is 
not yet broken; on the other hand, cases where a breach of the peace has already 
occurred.
227
 Article 39 makes no distinction between the two groups: in both groups of 
cases the use of even the strongest enforcement measures is equally authorized. The 
Resolution makes a distinction and provides different effects for each of the two groups. 
It reserves the use of armed forces only for those cases where the imminent danger has 
changed into an actual breach of peace or act of aggression. 
228
 
In this case fighting has already started and the means to suppress it might have recourse 
to fighting as well. On the contrary, where a threat to the peace exists, be it in the highest 
degree, but peace is not yet broken, fighting would start by collective action at a moment 
when there is perhaps a minor hope of preventing the threat to peace and of avoiding 
fighting from arising out of a breach of peace or act of aggression. 
229
 Andrassy states 
that “It is therefore reasonable to postpone the use of the extreme remedy till the moment 
when it is patent that the use of arms cannot be avoided. 
230
 “ Reicher states that 
The phrases "threat to the peace," "breach of the peace," or” act of aggression," 
when analyzed in the context of Chapters VI and VII, take a situation out of the 
former and place it squarely within the latter. When applied to the Uniting for 
Peace Resolution, therefore, these phrases create a definite limitation of a 
substantive nature, in as much as it is only when a problem reaches the level of 
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gravity contemplated in Chapter VII that the General Assembly may act under 
Part A of the Resolution; a simple Chapter VI situation is insufficient.
 231
 
 
 
c. Conditions that must be fulfilled before the General Assembly can proceed and issue 
Uniting for Peace Resolution  
 
After analyzing the legality of the Uniting for Peace Resolution according to the UN 
Charter, I will focus on this section in exploring in details the conditions which need to 
be fulfilled before the General Assembly can proceed and issue Uniting for Peace 
Resolution. Part A of the resolution begins with what may be referred to as the essential 
pre-conditions the conditions which must be fulfilled before the Assembly may take any 
steps under the provisions which follow: "If the Security Council, because of lack of 
unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.”232 
Four essential preconditions must be met before the General Assembly may proceed: 
The Security Council must have failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
233
Furthermore, there must appear to be 
"a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression." In addition, The Security 
Council's failure to exercise its primary responsibility must have been occasioned by one 
reason and one reason alone-the lack of unanimity of its permanent members. 
234
This 
amounts to a significant constraint on the Assembly. If, for instance, the permanent 
members agree unanimously that the best course to follow is one of non-interference-
inaction this precondition will not have been fulfilled and the Assembly will have no 
recourse under Resolution 377A (V), even if inaction is presumed to amount to failure.
235
 
The same would apply if the permanent members found themselves to be in unanimous 
agreement in opposing a resolution proposing concrete action. The Uniting for Peace 
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Resolution, having been framed with the veto power in mind, only applies in cases of 
lack of unanimity.
236
 
 
For the Uniting for Peace procedure, firstly the obligation under the Resolution is on the 
General Assembly to consider a matter immediately. “That is all very well as long as the 
Assembly happens to be in session at the relevant time. If, on the other hand, it is not in 
session-as was the case when the Afghanistan question arose”237it may meet in an 
emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request Article 27(2).
238
 This 
article provides that “decisions on procedural matters, while requiring nine affirmative 
votes, do not require the unanimity of the Council's permanent members. Requesting a 
meeting of the General Assembly is a procedural matter.”239Therefore, the Resolution 
declares as sufficient a simple majority as provided for procedural questions Article 27, 
paragraph 2.
 240
 Paragraph 1 of Part A concludes with two alternative procedures for 
convening an- emergency session: "Such emergency session shall be called if requested 
by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the 
Members of the United Nations." 
241
 
 
d. The General Assembly in Peacekeeping 
 
 This next section clarifies the General Assembly‘s role in authorization Peacekeeping 
forces. Peacekeeping forces were first used in 1956, when Israel, and later the United 
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Kingdom and France, invaded Egypt due to its nationalization of the Suez Canal and the 
General Assembly authorized a peacekeeping force in order to restore peace in the 
region. Moreover, the General Assembly did so when the vetoes of the United Kingdom 
and France had paralysed the Security Council. This course of events caused a debate 
over whether the General Assembly may authorize enforcement measures or whether the 
authorization of a peacekeeping mission is necessarily intended as an enforcement 
measure. 
242
 
In its advisory opinion in the Certain Expenses, the ICJ clearly stated that “Article 24 of 
the Charter gives the Security Council the primary responsibility for ensuring prompt and 
effective action for the maintenance of international peace and security.” 243However, the 
General Assembly must also concern itself with international peace and security. Article 
14 of the Charter authorizes the General Assembly to recommend measures for the 
peaceful adjustment of any situation.
244
 The word ‘measures’ implies some kind of 
action, and the only limitation which Article 14 imposes on the General Assembly is the 
restriction found in Article 12, namely, that the Assembly should not recommend 
measures while the Security Council is dealing with the same matter unless the Security 
Council requests the Assembly to do so. Accordingly, the advisory opinion continues:  
Whenever the General Assembly proceeds under Article 11 or under Article 14, 
the implementation of its recommendations for setting up commissions or other 
bodies involves organizational activity – action – in connection with the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Such implementation is a normal 
feature of functioning of the United Nations. Such committees, commissions or 
other bodies or individuals, constitute, in some cases, subsidiary organs 
established under the authority of Article 22 of the Charter. The functions of the 
General Assembly for which it may establish such subsidiary organs include, for 
example, investigation, observation and supervision, but the way in which such 
subsidiary organs are utilized depends on the consent of the state or states 
concerned. 
245
 
 
The main question is therefore the division of functions between the Security Council and 
the General Assembly. The function of the General Assembly under Article 14 may lead 
to an action once committees or commissions are set up for the implementation of its 
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resolution. This action may not however be a forceful one, unlike the ones the Security 
Council may initiate under Chapter VII of the Charter. For the implementation of an 
investigation, supervision or observation, the General Assembly must reach an agreement 
with the host state or states. 
246
Therefore, action taken by the General Assembly is still a 
recommendatory measure leaving final acceptance of the measure upon the willingness 
of the state or states to which it is addressed. 
247
The implementation of a measure 
recommended by the General Assembly depends upon whether the state or states are 
willing to comply with the relevant resolution; that is, it is an absolutely voluntary 
measure. 
248
The General Assembly may play an important role through the authorization 
of peacekeeping forces in separating adversaries, maintaining cease-fires, delivering 
humanitarian relief, helping refugees and displaced persons return to their homes, 
demobilizing combatants, and creating conditions that, for example, promote democracy 
and allow for free elections to be held.
249
 All these require action in a sense, perhaps not 
similar to the forceful measures envisaged in Chapter VII but certainly ones that help 
reduce the threat to international peace. 
250
 
 
The Soviet Union opposed the idea of establishing the peacekeeping force known as the 
UN Emergency Force after the Suez crisis, even if it visibly wanted the United Kingdom 
and France out of the Suez.
251
 The argument of the Soviet Union and its allies was that 
the Charter has very specific provisions for the use of force by the United Nations. 
252
Soviet Union and its allies cited the agreements on UN forces required under Article 
43 of the Charter. As the requirement of Article 43 was not followed in forming the UN 
Emergency Force, and as alternatives were not provided in the Charter, it was necessarily 
unlawful. 
253
Nevertheless ,the supporters of the UN peacekeeping forces argued that it 
was not only the Security Council that could mobilize the UN police; where the use of 
veto in the Security Council makes the initiative unsuccessful, the General Assembly can 
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form such a body to maintain the peace. The idea of such peacekeeping forces was then 
supported by the majority in voting in the UN bodies. 
254
 
 
In the Certain Expenses case, the International Court of Justice decided all the relevant 
questions concerning the legality of the establishment of peacekeeping forces. 
255
In 
response to the argument made by the Soviet Union and France that only the Security 
Council could authorize and supervise peacekeeping activities, the Court stated that the 
Council’s responsibility for maintaining international peace and security is primary, not 
exclusive.
256
 It noted that the General Assembly is also concerned with such matters.
257
 
The Assembly does not have to defer to the Security Council under Article 11(2) of the 
Charter unless enforcement action is necessary. 
258
The Court also pointed out that the 
function of peacekeeping forces is not similar to that of the enforcement measures for 
which Article 43 conditions are to be met. 
259
The issue was that the forces UNEF and 
ONUC were not authorized to take action against a state. However, they were sent with 
the consent of the states concerned. 
260
They were not authorized to act against the host 
state but rather were cooperating with it. In general, the General Assembly may play an 
important role by establishing peacekeeping forces to mitigate escalation of a situation 
that could cause a serious threat to the peace if no such measure is taken.
261 
 
In the framework of the relevant phrases in paragraph 1 of Part A of Resolution 377A(V) 
suggests that if the Security Council has failed to exercise its primary peacekeeping 
responsibility in a case which it has defined to fall within Chapter VII, then the General 
Assembly may act. 
262
However significant and wide the power in Part A may be, though, 
it has built into it an important limitation arising from the fact that the authority to 
recommend the use of armed force is confined to situations involving "a breach of the 
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peace or act of aggression.
263
 In relation to the Security Council's powers in the area of 
international peacekeeping, Chapters VI and VII distinguish between relatively less and 
more serious cases, with the stronger powers in Chapter VII reserved for the latter. The 
threshold of applicability of Chapter VII is found in the phrases "threat to the peace," 
"breach of the peace," or "act of aggression”. Only in these circumstances may the 
Security Council itself invoke its more serious powers, including the use of force.
264
 
 
In concluding the General Assembly has peacekeeping powers but there are three 
limitations: 
1. The first of these is the applicability of Article 12. However, this is a mere 
formality if a majority of nine members of the Security Council are prepared to 
vote for the removal of the relevant item from the agenda. 
2. Resolutions pursuant to Articles 10, 11 and 14, insofar as they contain 
"recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and 
security," require a two-thirds majority for passage in the General Assembly. 
3. The General Assembly may only "recommend." if a sufficient number of states 
are interested and willing to lend their support in carrying out a recommendation; 
there is no reason why it cannot be as effective as a binding decision.
265
 
 
e. the Uniting for Peace in practice 
 
This section illustrates the Uniting for Peace resolution in practice. I will refer to several 
cases in which the Uniting for Peace resolution was used. Several scholars argue that the 
Uniting for Peace was not used many times. In the 1980s, and writing on the occasion of 
the 30
th
 anniversary of the Uniting for Pease resolution, Reicher stated that “despite the 
passage of three decades, the Resolution has been invoked on only a handful of 
occasions.” 266The thirtieth anniversary, coupled with the occurrences of the use of the 
resolution particularly in the Afghanistan case. The Security Council had in fact 
considered the Afghanistan question, but the non-passage of the draft resolution had 
prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.
267
 Reicher argues that:  
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The failure had been brought about by the lack of unanimity of its permanent 
members. Finally, the substantive precondition in the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution had, in the Council's view, been fulfilled-a fact to be inferred from the 
transmission of the case to the General Assembly pursuant to that Resolution.
268
 
 
The cases of Suez, Hungary, the Congo, Bangladesh and Afghanistan were considerably 
clearer in this respect, as in each case the Security Council itself passed the matter to the 
General Assembly by resolution. 
269
  In the Lebanese case, while the Security Council 
did- not refer to the Uniting for Peace Resolution in its Resolution 129 (1958),
270
 which 
passed the matter to the Assembly, it was referred to the GA as emerging from the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution by calling "an emergency special session" of the Assembly. 
It is clear that the Uniting for Peace was not used many times after 30 years of its birth. 
Even after 60 years the situation didn’t change as Cowling argues that: 
The Uniting for Peace Resolution has been utilized on a number of occasions 
since it was passed in 1950. It did not play any role in the Korean conflict since 
the Russian government had withdrawn from the SC which meant that the 
intervention of the west would not be impeded by the Russian veto. He also says 
that it was also stressed that the GA can only make recommendations and not 
binding decisions (as is the case with the SC) and that the use of military 
enforcement action must be precipitated by a determination as to the existence of 
a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression by the Council.
271
 
 
The Problem with the Uniting for Peace is that it is not binding. Several scholars who 
argue that the Uniting for peace could be a solution in order to overcome the veto power 
within the Security Council. However, they argue that the resolution is not binding.  
The General assembly is responsible to maintain international peace and security in case 
the Security Council fails to maintain peace and security. According to Hossain the UN 
Charter imposes primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security upon the Security Council. Then what is left for the General Assembly is rather 
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secondary or subsidiary in this regard. 
272
Despite the restricted power given to the 
General Assembly by the Charter, an extension of the power is found in the resolution 
adopted during the early cold war period called Uniting for Peace. The issue is the 
legality of the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution. 273The Charter under Article 2(4) explicitly 
prohibits any kind of threat of force or use of force against the political independence and 
the territorial integrity of any state with the exception of self-defense under Article 
51.
274
The issue is that can the authorization by the General Assembly to use force be 
considered as a violation of Article 2(4). In the case of the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution, 
the General Assembly was only playing the role that should be played by the Security 
Council.  As the he Security Council is unable to act this responsibility is transferred to 
the General Assembly. By its authorization in the resolution the General Assembly did 
not cause any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state. 
275
 
 
The Uniting for peace resolution could be a way to overcome the veto power but the 
problem is that the resolution is not binding. However, still the Uniting for Peace 
resolution can have an influence even if this is not always the case as it can push 
supportive countries to take actions. According to Okhovat “it may seem that there is no 
preventive measure against the use of veto and limitless power of the permanent 
members”276 but he says that this is not the case. During the early phases of Korean War, 
the USA, concerned by the Soviet Union’s repeated use of veto power and fearing those 
actions might prevent the Council from protecting South Korea considering that the 
USSR supported North Korea took the matter to the General Assembly.
277
 With support 
from many countries the UN adopted a General Assembly resolution which is the Uniting 
for Peace in November 1950. This resolution reaffirms it is important that the Security 
Council carries out its responsibility in maintaining international peace and security and 
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that the permanent members limit their use of the veto power. 
278
This resolution further 
recognizes that the failure of the Security Council in fulfilling those tasks will not relieve 
the United Nations of its responsibilities under the Charter to maintain international peace 
and security. 
279
Thus, when the permanent members of the Security Council find that 
they are at odds and fail to reach unanimity on a matter that appears to be a threat to 
international peace and security, this resolution authorizes the General Assembly to 
immediately consider that matter and issue its own appropriate recommendations to the 
Member States for collective measures. “Those collective measures can include the use 
of armed force when necessary.” 280As a result, this resolution gives the GA final 
responsibility rather than secondary responsibility. Okhovar contends that “it can be held 
as a way to bypass the Security Council and a means for the General Assembly to 
overrule the vetoes of the UN Security Council P5 members.” 281 
 
The Uniting for Peace as I stated could be a way to push countries to take an action. Even 
though not frequent, this resolution has been applied during the GA’s history. One 
successful example of its application was in 1981 when South Africa was preventing the 
independence of Namibia. 
282
The General Assembly by using this resolution 
recommended sanctions against South Africa and assistance including military assistance 
to those who were fighting for Namibian independence. The resolutions passed by the 
GA using the provisions of “Uniting for Peace” are not binding (as none of the General 
Assembly resolutions are). 
283
Nevertheless, because of their nature, these resolutions can 
carry more weight and can press supportive countries to take actions. It was what 
happened regarding South Africa.
284
 As Richard Schifter, the former US Assistant 
Secretary of State for Human Rights explains, the resolution on South Africa passed 
under “Uniting for Peace” principles, was a significant step in the process of imposing 
sanctions on apartheid South Africa and de-legitimizing the country. 
285
Therefore, 
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bypassing the Security Council is not impossible, it can happen through the use of 
“Uniting for Peace” resolution.286 
 
The Uniting for Peace resolution has kind of moral effect as it can be used as a moral 
pressure to achieve peace and security which is useful. Even if the resolution is not 
binding but this kind of pressure can at least be a way to try to maintain peace and 
security. Asamoah evaluate the legal effect of the GA resolutions. He stated that “it is 
important to distinguish between the binding nature and the legal effect of resolutions of 
the General Assembly.” 287Moreover, resolutions may have a legal effect even though 
they are not considered by states to be binding upon them. Furthermore, the scope of 
legal effect is wider than that of legally binding. The binding nature of resolutions is only 
one aspect of the legal effect that can be considered. In this context the legal basis of the 
particular resolution becomes relevant and the charter provisions on the competence of 
the General Assembly must be considered. Most essential, is the influence of General 
Assembly resolutions upon the growth of the rules of international law. 
288
 He added that: 
Apart from their legal effect, resolutions may have other purposes and results. 
They are generally recognized, for example, as expressions of the moral 
conscience of mankind and therefore capable of exerting moral pressure. It may 
not be desirable to depend on moral force alone, but it must be remembered that 
in the absence of an international enforcement authority, one of the means of 
insuring obedience to the rules of the international order is the moral reprobation 
attaching to their infraction.
289
 
 
In sum, moral pressure is only part of the solution but it can not always be a way to 
achieve peace and security. For that reason Uniting for Peace can not be considered a 
way to overcome the veto power. It is mandatory that the international community find 
other solutions. Some scholars think that the uniting for peace resolution is not really a 
solution to overcome the veto power. They argue that the UN needs reform especially 
within the Security Council or the general assembly.  
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According to Voeten, the ‘Uniting for Peace’ could no longer be used effectively. After 
the early 1960s, when the US and the West lost their majority in the UNGA as the 
Western powers used the temporary absence of the USSR in 1950 to allow the UNGA 
authority to take measures to preserve international peace and security if the UNSC were 
deadlocked. Following that, the UNGA still passed many resolutions related to security, 
but they were more often ignored and produced few public goods. 
290
For example, US 
President Ronald Reagan famously claimed that the 1983 UNGA resolution condemning 
the United States for its intervention in Grenada “didn’t upset his breakfast at all” 291 
Voeten added that the solution is to reform the UN and he illustrate that by giving 
previous example such as the case of the transformation of the GATT to WTO. He stated 
that: 
In the past fifteen years, we have witnessed major institutional reforms and 
innovations in the international arena. The EU broadened, deepened, and moved 
increasingly towards a supranational decision-making structure. NATO accepted 
new member states and modernized its military command structure. The 
international trade system was transformed fundamentally by the replacement of 
GATT with the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its highly legalized 
dispute-resolution mechanism. . . The UN Security Council (UNSC) is an 
important example. What makes the UNSC’s institutional persistence so 
interesting is that its activities have changed rather dramatically with the Cold 
War’s ending.292 
 
ehta also thinks that the solution to overcome the veto power should be by reforming 
the UN. As the General Assembly needs to regain its powers as this will have impact on 
the resolutions related to R2P concept. 
293
The Charter makes it clear that the General 
Assembly of all member states is the primary UN body. Article 15 says that “the 
Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security 
Council…and from the other Organs of the United Nations”.294 The chief limitation on its 
powers comes from Article 12 which lies down that when the Security Council is 
exercising its functions in dealing with matters of peace and security the Assembly 
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refrain from making any recommendations. 
295
 “While this is a necessary condition it 
should be modified by a new rule which should be mutually agreed by both 
institutions.”296He added that:  
The powers of the General Assembly should be enhanced so that it can play a 
vital role debating and deciding important international issues. At present, each 
autumn, it is faced with a daunting agenda. On a positive note, the General 
Assembly has powers which can be activated for bringing Peace as the Uniting 
for Peace resolution of 1950 which was used to override the monopoly of Security 
Council for resolving the war in Suez. However, the resolution is not binding. The 
UN need to be more transparent and democratic institution.
297
 
 
These points of view show that it is really necessary to overcome the veto power within 
the Security Council in order to have fair decisions concerning the resolutions related to 
R2P. The Uniting for Peace resolution could be a solution as all members of the General 
Assembly could participate in deciding whether or not R2P resolution is necessary. Some 
others think that as a moral effect Uniting for Peace could have an impact in deciding 
whether to intervene or not in a state under the concept of R2P. I think that Uniting for 
Peace may be in some cases a way to achieve a fair decision in deciding whether to 
intervene or not even if it is not binding. 
4- The future of the Uniting for Peace and the concept of R2P  
It is clear from this analysis that according to the UN Charter the General Assembly’s 
resolutions are not binding and that the Uniting for Peace Resolution can only be 
implemented if the members of the UN really wants to issue a resolution and to intervene 
under the concept of R2P. The issue is that in our days which witnesses many crises such 
as the case of Libya
298
 or Cote d’Ivore299 we really need the UN to authorize resolutions 
which can save the civilians for crime against humanity or genocide. However, these 
resolutions should not depend on politics like what it happing currently with Syria. In 
2012 the Security Council failed to adapt draft resolution on Syria as a result of Russia 
                                               
295 Id. 
296 Vijay Mehta, supra not 293 at 4 
297 Id. 
298 United Nations Security Council resolution 1973, SC/10200 ( march 2011) 
299 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1975, S/RES/1975 ( march 2011) 
 59 
and China’s veto.300 The UN members in order to end this violence went to the General 
Assembly which issued a resolution that condemns the human violation done by the 
regime but the GA’s resolutions are not binding. The issue is that can the GA uniting for 
peace resolution be considered a solution for the Syrian crisis. As I mentioned earlier that 
General Assembly invoke the “Uniting for Peace” resolution (377 A), a measure 
established to continue the deadlock at the Security Council. The “Uniting for Peace” 
famously did succeed in 1950 .In this case, it served as a way of authorizing “collective 
measures” including the “use of armed force” during the Korean War, despite consistent  
Soviet vetoes in the UNSC. 
301
 As I stated earlier an Emergency Special Session (ESS) of 
the General Assembly can be called either by a procedural vote in the UNSC or within 24 
hours of a majority of General Assembly members requesting one of the UN Secretary-
General. Taking this into consideration in the case of Syria if a resolution was passed for 
Syria similarly authorizing the use of force, this would provide a legal justification for 
intervention. Weiss stated that:  
The main difficulty, of course, would be convincing the majority of the General 
Assembly members to support it, a contingency that seems remote without 
strenuous lobbying from the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC), which has 57 member states drawn from the Muslim-majority 
and Arab countries. 
302
 
Finally after all this we can conclude that the Uniting for peace is a way to overcome the 
P5 power but as it is not binding this will depend on the well of the members to use it. 
The international community still needs to find a solution to overcome the veto control.  
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V. Conclusion  
The UN was created in order to maintain peace and security. In order to achieve this goal 
the concept of responsibility to protect was born after the Rwanda genocide as a way to 
intervene to protect civilians. The concept of R2P passed through several phases starting 
from the birth of the idea followed by the feeling of the international community to issue 
reports in order to clarify the importance of this concept. Then the third phase in which 
UN issued resolution legalizing R2P. The concept of R2P does not contradict the UN 
charter. The R2P concept does not change anything it is only a way for the Security 
Council to enforce its action. In addition, UN Charter recognizes legitimate roles for 
regional organizations and regional arrangements in Chapter VIII. The general assembly 
also has a role in maintaining peace and security and in case the Security Council fails to 
reach its main purpose the General Assembly can do this through the Uniting for Peace 
resolution. The Uniting for Peace resolution is a way to overcome the veto control and 
allows the 193 members to have a voice in deciding whether it is necessary to intervene 
in a country to save its civilians from crimes against humanity, genocide or war crimes or 
no. However, the Uniting for Peace Resolution is not binding which means that the 
international community needs to find another solution to overcome the dominance of the 
P5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
